标题:How to tell essence (when you sense one)
作者:Ivanov, Ivan V.
作者机构:[Ivanov, Ivan V.] Shandong Univ, Sch Philosophy & Social Dev, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
通讯作者:Ivanov, IV
通讯作者地址:[Ivanov, IV]Shandong Univ, Sch Philosophy & Social Dev, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
来源:CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
出版年:2019
卷:49
期:2
页码:147-168
DOI:10.1080/00455091.2018.1516974
关键词:Revelation; perceptual knowledge; essence; necessity; intrinsicality;; color
摘要:How could perceptual experiences reveal matters of essentiality? Answering this question is crucial for vindicating a thesis about the epistemic import of experience, commonly known as Revelation. The thesis comes in a weak and a strong version. Only on the strong one could it make up an authoritative piece of common sense. But this version also seems to demand too much of our experiences, namely that they can reveal essentiality. However, the impression that our experiences are not suited for this turns out to be due to a non-mandatory assumption about how the revelation of essentiality would work.
收录类别:SCOPUS;A&HCI
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85053372314&doi=10.1080%2f00455091.2018.1516974&partnerID=40&md5=3ddd9b39b30cba04a35b6c47d99986d9
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