标题：Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding
作者：Du S.; Peng J.; Nie T.; Yu Y.
作者机构：[Du, S] School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, 230026, China;[ Peng, J] School of Management, University of Scien 更多
通讯作者地址：[Nie, T] School of Management, University of Science and Technology of ChinaChina;
来源：European Journal of Operational Research
关键词：Compensation mechanism; Crowdfunding; Game theory; Informational cascade; Pricing
摘要：With consideration of the ambiguity and overfunding effects, this study develops generalized models to compare the sequential and simultaneous mechanisms in reward-based crowdfunding. Ambiguity effect is a negative psychological perception of customers since they lack the information to infer the product's quality, however, overfunding effect is a positive psychological perception that enhances customers’ confidence in the product's quality. Theoretically, we show that the two mechanisms may dominate each other in terms of entrepreneur and the two opposite effects can play significant roles in deciding the optimal crowdfunding mechanism. Furthermore, we propose a simple compensation mechanism to improve entrepreneur's expected payoff and the crowdfunding's success rate under both mechanisms. Finally, we analyse the informational cascade in crowdfunding and show how entrepreneur can use this phenomenon to maximize her expected payoff. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.