标题:Fair computation with tit-for-tat strategy
作者:Wang, Yilei ;Xu, Qiuliang ;Liu, Zhe
通讯作者:Xu, Q.
作者机构:[Wang, Yilei ;Xu, Qiuliang ] School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Jinan, China;[Liu, Zhe ] Laboratory of Algorithmics, Cryp 更多
会议名称:5th IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems, INCoS 2013
会议日期:9 September 2013 through 11 September 2013
来源:Proceedings - 5th International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems, INCoS 2013
出版年:2013
页码:309-314
DOI:10.1109/INCoS.2013.55
关键词:Fairness; Nash equilibrium; Rational party; Secure computation; Tit-for-tat
摘要:Complete fairness means that either all parties learn the output of the function or none of them does. It was deemed as an impossible task in general in secure two party computation by Cleve (STOC 1986). However, a seminal result of complete fairness between two parties was achieved by Gordorn et al. (STOC 2008). Recently Groce and Katz (Euro crypt 2012) corrected the insufficient assumptions and gave some positive results of fairness. Here we revisit this problem and introduce the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy into rational two-party computation. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first secure two-party computation protocol with constant rounds that allows both parties to know the terminal round. © 2013 IEEE.
收录类别:EI;SCOPUS
Scopus被引频次:1
资源类型:会议论文;期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84890023745&doi=10.1109%2fINCoS.2013.55&partnerID=40&md5=f6b6d7ac54db32e365e16c967789a740
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