标题：Corporate governance, executive compensation incentives and corporate performance — Analysis of improved principal-agent innovation model
作者机构：[Li, Shanshan ] School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan; Shandong; 250014, China;[Li, Shanshan ] School of Management Science and Engineering 更多
来源：International Journal of Simulation: Systems, Science and Technology
关键词：Corporate governance; Corporate performance; Executive compensation incentive; Principal-agent model
摘要：In this paper, the case of the introduction of observable variables to expound research on principal - agent model, and establish the innovation model of company executive compensation incentives. By comparing the effect of model incentive before and after bringing other observable variables, we analyze the change of incentive intensity, agency costs, actual income and risk sharing, which theoretically proves the superiority of the model. It is concluded: there is not causal relationship between the effort of operator and fixed remuneration paid to him, but based on the output pay system, there will be significant incentive effects on the operators. © 2017, UK Simulation Society. All rights reserved.