标题:Cryptanalysis of round-reduced ASCON
作者:Li, Yanbin; Zhang, Guoyan; Wang, Wei; Wang, Meiqin
作者机构:[Li Yanbin] Shandong University, Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Ji'nan, Shandong 250100, Ch 更多
通讯作者:Wang, Meiqin(mqwang@sdu.edu.cn)
通讯作者地址:[Wang, MQ]Shandong Univ, Key Lab Cryptol Technol & Informat Secur, Minist Educ, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China;[Wang, MQ]State Cryptog Adm, State Key L 更多
来源:中国科学. 信息科学
出版年:2017
卷:60
期:3
DOI:10.1007/s11432-016-0283-3
关键词:Cryptanalysis; ASCON; cryptanalysis
摘要:ASCON~(1)) is a candidate to the ongoing CAESAR competition~(2)) which is launched to identify good authenticated encryption schemes from 2013. In CT-RSA 2015, the designers performed several detailed cryptanalysis on ASCON which retrieved the key for ASCON with at most 6-round initialization in a nonce-respecting scenario [1]. They also gave forgery attacks on 3/4-round finalization with 2~(33)/2~(101) messages in a nonce-misuse scenario. This article provides key recovery attacks on round-reduced version of ASCON with 7 rounds initialization and 5 rounds phase of plaintext processing, which works on round-reduced initialization comprising more than half number of original 12 rounds in the first time. In addition, we create forgery on 4/5/6 rounds finalization with 2~9/2~(17)/2~(33) messages, respectively, which is more practical compared to the previous ones. Our work is summarized in Table 1.
收录类别:EI;CSCD;SCOPUS;SCIE
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85007499960&doi=10.1007%2fs11432-016-0283-3&partnerID=40&md5=3d20568ad52e31827682d7ec24c6d3b2
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