标题:Dynamics and stability of potential hyper-networked evolutionary games
作者:Liu Ting;Wang Yuanhua;Cheng Daizhan
作者机构:[Liu Ting] Institute of Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 1001 更多
通讯作者:Cheng, Dai-Zhan(dcheng@iss.ac.cn)
通讯作者地址:[Cheng, D.-Z] Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Institute of Systems Science, Chinese Academy of SciencesChina;
来源:国际自动化与计算杂志
出版年:2017
卷:14
期:2
页码:229-238
DOI:10.1007/s11633-017-1056-0
关键词:(Hyper-) Networked evolutionary game (HNEG); cascading myopic best response adjustment rule (MBRAR); Nash equilibrium; potential; semi-tensor product of matrices
摘要:This paper considers the modeling and convergence of hyper-networked evolutionary games (HNEGs). In an HNEG the network graph is a hypergraph, which allows the fundamental network game to be a multi-player one. Using semi-tensor product of matrices and the fundamental evolutionary equation, the dynamics of an HNEG is obtained and we extend the results about the networked evolutionary games to show whether an HNEG is potential and how to calculate the potential. Then we propose a new strategy updating rule, called the cascading myopic best response adjustment rule (MBRAR), and prove that under the cascading MBRAR the strategies of an HNEG will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. An example is presented and discussed in detail to demonstrate the theoretical and numerical results. © 2017, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
收录类别:EI;CSCD;SCOPUS
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85013223139&doi=10.1007%2fs11633-017-1056-0&partnerID=40&md5=56c730ddd21e3ad824006bea7d058f5c
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