标题:Dynamic Games of R&D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
作者:Li, Changying; Zhang, Jianhu
作者机构:[Li, Changying; Zhang, Jianhu] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
通讯作者:Li, CY
通讯作者地址:[Li, CY]Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, 27 Shanda South Rd, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
来源:JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
出版年:2013
卷:169
期:4
页码:660-679
DOI:10.1628/093245613X671184
摘要:Based on a Hotel ling-type model, this paper analyzes a differential game where two firms engage in quality-enhancing research and development (R&D). The analysis is formulated in terms of open-loop and feedback solutions. We find that the open-loop stationary levels of R&D and quality are socially efficient. Moreover, compared to open-loop strategies, feedback strategies lead to higher stationary levels of prices and profits, but lower levels of R&D, quality, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In addition, compared to the social optimum, both open-loop and feedback strategies yield a closer stationary distance between the two firms.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SSCI
WOS核心被引频次:1
Scopus被引频次:1
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84889656970&doi=10.1628%2f093245613X671184&partnerID=40&md5=74e6ec79ab3c80a8354525e816e96453
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