标题:Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly under demand uncertainty
作者:Jianhu Zhang;Changying Li
作者机构:[Zhang, J] School of Economics, Shandong University, 27 Shanda South Road, Jinan, 250100 Shandong, China;[ Li, C] School of Economics, Shandong Univer 更多
通讯作者:Li, CY
通讯作者地址:[Li, CY]Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, 27 Shanda South Rd, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
来源:Journal of Economics
出版年:2013
卷:108
期:3
页码:273-289
DOI:10.1007/s00712-012-0273-9
关键词:Endogenous timing;Mixed oligopoly;Demand uncertainty;Horizontal differentiation
摘要:This paper analyzes a Hotelling-type game in a mixed oligopoly, where firms can either enter the market in period 1, facing demand uncertainty, or postpone their entry, in order to acquire complete information. It is shown that, for a high (low) levelof uncertainty, there is a pure (mixed)-strategy equilibrium. Moreover, the standard result in the literature—that uncertainty is a differentiation force, is only possible when the degree of uncertainty is small. An increase in the degree of uncertainty could force firms to delay their entry and lead to a socially optimal outcome.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SSCI
WOS核心被引频次:3
Scopus被引频次:2
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84875505015&doi=10.1007%2fs00712-012-0273-9&partnerID=40&md5=e288627787d98e4e5c1d1f5637991101
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