标题:Optimal assignment of principalship in cooperative R&D under incomplete information
作者:Wang, Changfeng ;Zhang, Peng
作者机构:[Wang, Changfeng ] School of Management Shandong, Jiaotong University, No. 5, Jiaoxiao Road, Tianqiao District, Jinan 250023, China;[Zhang, Peng ] Sch 更多
通讯作者:Wang, C
来源:ICIC Express Letters
出版年:2011
卷:5
期:6
页码:1975-1980
关键词:Cooperative R&D; Incomplete information; Monitoring; Principalship
摘要:This paper develops a general equilibrium model with two firms in cooperative R&D projects to investigate the optimal assignment of principalship under incomplete information. We make a distinction between cooperative R&D effort and monitoring effort. When it is costly to sign contracts on efforts under incomplete information, the optimal assignment of principalship in cooperative R&D depends on the interaction between each member's importance in cooperative R&D, the effectiveness of monitoring and the degree of R&D teamwork. © 2011 ISSN 1881-803X.
收录类别:SCOPUS;EI;SCOPUS
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-79956146203&partnerID=40&md5=12515a8caad6732f2ae49bc10e801801
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