标题：Supervision of Independent Directors and Top Executive Turnover: Empirical Evidence from China's Listed Firms Based on Panel Data
作者机构：[Qiu Qian] Shandong Univ, Sch Management, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China.
会议名称：5th International Symposium for Corporate Governance
会议日期：SEP 05-06, 2009
来源：PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, BOOKS 1 AND 2
关键词：independent directors; supervision; turnover of top executives
摘要：Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for the period 2004-2007, we measure the supervision of independent directors with six dimensions. We find that the supervision of independent directors had very significant positive effects on turnover of top executives. We further find that the proportion of independent directors, separation of CEO and Chairman, the number of accounting experts and reputation had important effects on turnover of top executives. The effects of stock holding shares ratio of the biggest boarder were secondary and allowance had relative small influence on it, which reflected that independent directors did not have enough incentive to supervise.