标题:Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value
作者:Gao, Lei
作者机构:[Gao, Lei] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
通讯作者:Gao, L
通讯作者地址:[Gao, L]Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
来源:JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
出版年:2017
卷:121
期:3
页码:197-237
DOI:10.1007/s00712-017-0524-x
关键词:Venture capital; Staged financing; Incomplete contracts; Holdup; Real; options
摘要:This paper investigates financial contract design in venture capital investments and shows that staged financing is the implementation of optimal contracts. In designing contracts, venture capitalists consider the value of real options and the costs of holdup. This consideration boils down to contract rigidity and flexibility: rigid contracts mitigate the holdup problem of entrepreneurs, but have little option values, whereas flexible contracts create real options for venture capitalists in corporate decision-making, but yield weak bargaining power when ventures appear promising. In optimal contracts, venture capitalists choose flexibility by separating capital into stages and then strategically allocating control rights at each stage. This strategy creates option value in corporate governance, and can protect sunk investments in distress while capturing the potential benefits of good outcomes.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SSCI
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85011632752&doi=10.1007%2fs00712-017-0524-x&partnerID=40&md5=e2b755a198e03284dff508b42e58f9ed
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