标题:Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties
作者:Cheng-Zhong Qin;Martin Shubik
作者机构:[Qin, C.-Z] Research Center for Games and Economic Behavior, Shandong University, Jinan City, China, Department of Economics, University of California 更多
通讯作者:Shubik, M
通讯作者地址:[Shubik, M]Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA.
来源:Journal of Economics
出版年:2012
卷:106
期:2
页码:119-132
DOI:10.1007/s00712-011-0234-8
关键词:Competitive equilibrium;Credit mechanism;Marginal utility of income;Saddle-point characterization;Welfare economics
摘要:The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can beapplied to uniquely select each of the competitive equilibria with suitable default penalties. We identify two classes of such economies.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SSCI
WOS核心被引频次:1
Scopus被引频次:2
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84861704536&doi=10.1007%2fs00712-011-0234-8&partnerID=40&md5=fb3f7a3c6d9c2c8698ea2c65d2e9f219
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