标题：Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties
作者：Cheng-Zhong Qin;Martin Shubik
作者机构：[Qin, C.-Z] Research Center for Games and Economic Behavior, Shandong University, Jinan City, China, Department of Economics, University of California 更多[Qin, C.-Z] Research Center for Games and Economic Behavior, Shandong University, Jinan City, China, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States;[ Shubik, M] Economics Department, Yale University, New Haven, United States 收起
通讯作者：Shubik, M
通讯作者地址：[Shubik, M]Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA.
来源：Journal of Economics
出版年：2012
卷：106
期：2
页码：119-132
DOI：10.1007/s00712-011-0234-8
关键词：Competitive equilibrium;Credit mechanism;Marginal utility of income;Saddle-point characterization;Welfare economics
摘要：The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can beapplied to uniquely select each of the competitive equilibria with suitable default penalties. We identify two classes of such economies.
