标题:Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties
作者:Cheng-Zhong Qin;Martin Shubik
作者机构:[Qin, C.-Z] Research Center for Games and Economic Behavior, Shandong University, Jinan City, China, Department of Economics, University of California 更多[Qin, C.-Z] Research Center for Games and Economic Behavior, Shandong University, Jinan City, China, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States;[ Shubik, M] Economics Department, Yale University, New Haven, United States 收起
通讯作者:Shubik, M
通讯作者地址:[Shubik, M]Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA.
来源:Journal of Economics
出版年:2012
卷:106
期:2
页码:119-132
DOI:10.1007/s00712-011-0234-8
关键词:Competitive equilibrium;Credit mechanism;Marginal utility of income;Saddle-point characterization;Welfare economics
摘要:The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can beapplied to uniquely select each of the competitive equilibria with suitable default penalties. We identify two classes of such economies.