标题:Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology
作者:Lu, Jingfeng; Shen, Bo; Wang, Zhewei
作者机构:[Lu, Jingfeng] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260, Singapore.; [Shen, Bo] Wuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, L 更多
通讯作者:Wang, ZW
通讯作者地址:[Wang, ZW]Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, 27 Shanda Nanlu, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China.
来源:JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
出版年:2017
卷:72
页码:25-35
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.06.003
关键词:Reverse nested lottery contest; Multistage contest; Effort maximization;; Optimal contest design
摘要:In this paper, we study effort-maximizing contest design under the "reverse" nested lottery contest model of Fu et al. (2014) which is the "mirror image" of the conventional nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996). We show that under the reverse-lottery technology, a single-stage winner-take-all grand contest dominates all other feasible designs when the contest is sufficiently noisy. This result is in dramatic contrast to the conventional wisdom on the optimality of multistage elimination contests that is grounded under the conventional nested lottery contest technology in the literature. In the framework of a noisy-performance ranking model, the conventional and reverse models differ only in the noise on players' performance. Our study therefore reveals the important role that the noise term plays in modeling imperfectly discriminatory contests. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SCIE;SSCI
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85030698824&doi=10.1016%2fj.jmateco.2017.06.003&partnerID=40&md5=eb471b4cdc0ee2b7091d7955157e5465
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