标题:Attributing error without taking a stand
作者:Perl, Caleb; Schroeder, Mark
作者机构:[Perl, Caleb] Shandong Univ, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China.; [Schroeder, Mark] Univ Southern Calif, Los Angeles, CA USA.
通讯作者:Perl, C
通讯作者地址:[Perl, C]Shandong Univ, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China.
来源:PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
出版年:2019
卷:176
期:6
页码:1453-1471
DOI:10.1007/s11098-019-01248-6
关键词:Error theory; Presupposition; Normative neutrality
摘要:Moral error theory is the doctrine that our first-order moral commitments are pervaded by systematic error. It has been objected that this makes the error theory itself a position in first-order moral theory that should be judged by the standards of competing first-order moral theories (Here we are thinking, for example, of Dworkin (Philos Public Aff 25(2):87-139, 1996) and Kramer (Moral realism as a moral doctrine. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). Kramer: the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. It is not something that can adequately be contested or confirmed through non-ethical reasoning [2009, 1]). This paper shows that error theorists can resist this charge if they adopt a particular understanding of the presuppositions of moral discourse.
收录类别:SCOPUS;A&HCI
Scopus被引频次:1
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85060917874&doi=10.1007%2fs11098-019-01248-6&partnerID=40&md5=34e292ba5e008e394cf4f996249f3b4f
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