标题：Attributing error without taking a stand
作者：Perl, Caleb; Schroeder, Mark
作者机构：[Perl, Caleb] Shandong Univ, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China.; [Schroeder, Mark] Univ Southern Calif, Los Angeles, CA USA.
通讯作者地址：[Perl, C]Shandong Univ, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China.
关键词：Error theory; Presupposition; Normative neutrality
摘要：Moral error theory is the doctrine that our first-order moral commitments are pervaded by systematic error. It has been objected that this makes the error theory itself a position in first-order moral theory that should be judged by the standards of competing first-order moral theories (Here we are thinking, for example, of Dworkin (Philos Public Aff 25(2):87-139, 1996) and Kramer (Moral realism as a moral doctrine. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). Kramer: the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. It is not something that can adequately be contested or confirmed through non-ethical reasoning [2009, 1]). This paper shows that error theorists can resist this charge if they adopt a particular understanding of the presuppositions of moral discourse.