标题:Linear Quadratic Nonzero Sum Differential Games with Asymmetric Information
作者:Chang, Dejian; Xiao, Hua
作者机构:[Chang, Dejian] Shandong Univ, Qilu Secur Inst Financial Studies, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China.; [Chang, Dejian] Shandong Univ, Sch Math, Jinan 250 更多
通讯作者:Xiao, Hua
通讯作者地址:[Xiao, H]Shandong Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Weihai 264209, Peoples R China.
来源:MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING
出版年:2014
卷:2014
DOI:10.1155/2014/262314
摘要:This paper studies a linear quadratic nonzero sum differential game problem with asymmetric information. Compared with the existing literature, a distinct feature is that the information available to players is asymmetric. Nash equilibrium points are obtained for several classes of asymmetric information by stochastic maximum principle and technique of completion square. The systems of some Riccati equations and forward-backward stochastic filtering equations are introduced and the existence and uniqueness of the solutions are proved. Finally, the unique Nash equilibrium point for each class of asymmetric information is represented in a feedback form of the optimal filtering of the state, through the solutions of the Riccati equations.
收录类别:EI;SCOPUS;SCIE
WOS核心被引频次:2
Scopus被引频次:2
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84935003079&doi=10.1155%2f2014%2f262314&partnerID=40&md5=7b9fe29352006a9a0bc70e0d81076477
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