标题:Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies
作者:Liu, Longhua; Lin, Junshan; Qin, Chengzhong
作者机构:[Liu, Longhua] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China.; [Lin, Junshan] Peoples Bank China, Jinan Branch, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples 更多
通讯作者:Lin, JS
通讯作者地址:[Lin, JS]Peoples Bank China, Jinan Branch, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China.
来源:ECONOMICS LETTERS
出版年:2018
卷:166
页码:83-85
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.022
关键词:Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Cournot equilibrium; Cross-holding
摘要:We show that a high-cost firm may be induced to compete less aggressively when its ownership is increasingly held by a low-cost firm. With asymmetric information on technologies, cross-holdings may make it desirable for both the high- and low-cost firms to reveal private information. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SSCI
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85042911067&doi=10.1016%2fj.econlet.2018.02.022&partnerID=40&md5=632367ee3ca08c621173104eec8f092d
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