标题:Partial acquisition with an excluded public rival
作者:Cheng, Long; Heywood, John S.; Ye, Guangliang
作者机构:[Cheng, Long] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China.; [Heywood, John S.] Univ Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA.; [Ye, Guangl 更多
通讯作者:Ye, GL
通讯作者地址:[Ye, GL]Renmin Univ China, Antitrust & Competit Policy Ctr, Hanqing Inst, Natl Acad Dev & Strategy, 59 Zhongguancun St, Beijing 100872, Peoples R Chin 更多
来源:INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE
出版年:2019
卷:59
页码:164-173
DOI:10.1016/j.iref.2018.08.017
关键词:Partial acquisition; Public firm; Salop circular market; Control; threshold
摘要:This paper examines partial acquisition in the face of an outside public firm. We show that when the acquiring firm is domestic, partial acquisition takes place for any institutional threshold for pricing control. Yet, when the acquiring firm is foreign, partial acquisition can be forestalled by a sufficiently high threshold requirement. This threshold can increase domestic welfare and global welfare by stopping an inefficient partial acquisition. Moreover, this mixed market structure can generate greater global welfare than one with an outside private firm.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SSCI
Scopus被引频次:1
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059338538&doi=10.1016%2fj.iref.2018.08.017&partnerID=40&md5=20ce28b1e27f992d05037ecfc3279d7c
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