标题:Impossible differential cryptanalysis of 14-round camellia-192
作者:Jia, Keting ;Wang, Ning
通讯作者:Jia, Keting
作者机构:[Jia, Keting ] Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing; 100084, China;[Wang, Ning ] School of Mathematics, Shandon 更多
会议名称:21st Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2016
会议日期:4 July 2016 through 6 July 2016
来源:Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
出版年:2016
卷:9723
页码:363-378
DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-40367-0_23
关键词:Block cipher; Camellia; Impossible differential attack
摘要:As an international standard by ISO/IEC, Camellia is a widely used block cipher, which has received much attention from cryptanalysts. The impossible differential attack is one of efficient methods to analyze Camellia. Liu et al. gave an 8-round impossible differential, of which the input and output differences depend on some weak keys. In this paper, we apply some key relations to build the precomputation table to reduce time complexity and give some relations between the size of weak key sets and the number of input and output differences of the impossible differentials, which are used to balance the time complexity and the fraction of key space attacked. Furthermore, we give an impossible differential attack on 14-round Camellia-192 with 2126.5 known plaintexts and 2189.32 encryptions. Our impossible differential attack works one more round than previous cryptanalysis results. © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016.
收录类别:EI;SCOPUS
资源类型:会议论文;期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84978805296&doi=10.1007%2f978-3-319-40367-0_23&partnerID=40&md5=4824108cfc018ec40668db5d692d43b5
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