标题:Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence
作者:Li, Sanxi; Ma, Hongkun; Zeng, Chenhang
作者机构:[Li, Sanxi] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China.; [Ma, Hongkun; Zeng, Chenhang] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 250100, Peop 更多
通讯作者:Zeng, CH
通讯作者地址:[Zeng, CH]Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China.
来源:ECONOMICS LETTERS
出版年:2015
卷:134
页码:37-40
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.006
关键词:Cross holding; Entry deterrence; Passive ownership
摘要:This paper builds a duopoly model to study the strategic effects of cross holding on entry deterrence. We show that, in equilibrium, the incumbent optimally chooses strictly positive cross holdings in each other to deter entry for the potential entrant. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
收录类别:SCOPUS;SSCI
WOS核心被引频次:1
Scopus被引频次:1
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84934974052&doi=10.1016%2fj.econlet.2015.06.006&partnerID=40&md5=c25bc8255eb951876a56ed7be3ef247a
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