标题：A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WORKER REPLACEMENT AND WAGE RIGIDITY
作者：Snell, Andy; Thomas, Jonathan P.; Wang, Zhewei
作者机构：[Snell, Andy; Thomas, Jonathan P.] Univ Edinburgh, Sch Econ, Edinburgh EH8 9JT, Midlothian, Scotland.; [Wang, Zhewei] Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 更多
通讯作者地址：[Wang, ZW]Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, Jinan 250100, Peoples R China.
摘要：We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labor market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly nonlinear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence. (JEL E32, J41)