标题:Supply chain coordination in the presence of uncertain yield and demand
作者:Xie L.; Ma J.; Goh M.
作者机构:[Xie, L] College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China, School of Management, Shandong University, Shandong, China;[ Ma, J] 更多
通讯作者:Ma, J(Mjhtju@aliyun.com)
通讯作者地址:[Ma, J] College of Management and Economics, Tianjin UniversityChina;
来源:International Journal of Production Research
出版年:2020
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2020.1762942
关键词:buy-back-revenue-sharing contract; buyback contract; coordination; Yield uncertainty
摘要:This paper focuses on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a seller and a buyer. Considering the case where the buyer faces uncertain demand and yield, the paper investigates the buyback contract for the supply chain and studies how the yield uncertainty and the relative bargaining power affect the performance of buyback contract. The results suggest that when the seller's bargaining power is relatively high and can control the uncertain yield, the buyback contract is sufficient to coordinate the supply chain. Conversely, when the seller's bargaining power is relatively low or cannot guarantee yield stability, the buyback contract does not work. To coordinate such a supply chain, a combined contract named Buy-Back-Revenue-Sharing contract is proposed. Furthermore, this paper presents the optimal orders to maximize the profits of the buyer and the whole supply chain and it finds that if the seller cannot control the yield, the buyer will place fewer orders and both parties will gain lower profit with supply chain coordination. © 2020, © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
收录类别:SCOPUS
Scopus被引频次:2
资源类型:期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85084862302&doi=10.1080%2f00207543.2020.1762942&partnerID=40&md5=f2c40033a4656e9b43f8720ea6951287
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