标题:On convergence of evolutionary games
作者:Cheng, Daizhan ;Qi, Hongsheng ;Wang, Yuanhua ;Liu, Ting
通讯作者:Cheng, Daizhan
作者机构:[Cheng, Daizhan ;Wang, Yuanhua ] Institute of Control Science and Engineering, Shandong University, Ji'nan; 250061, China;[Cheng, Daizhan ;Qi, Hongshe 更多
会议名称:Proceedings of the 33rd Chinese Control Conference, CCC 2014
会议日期:28 July 2014 through 30 July 2014
来源:Proceedings of the 33rd Chinese Control Conference, CCC 2014
出版年:2014
页码:5539-5545
DOI:10.1109/ChiCC.2014.6895886
关键词:convergence; evolutionary game; Nash equilibrium; Potential game; sequential or cascading myopic best response adjustment rule
摘要:The set of finite games with fixed numbers of players and strategies for every player becomes a vector space. Certain equivalences are introduced to classify the elements in the vector space of finite games. Then the subspace of (exact or weighted) potential games are calculated. For the evolutionary (finite) games, certain strategy updating rules are investigated, which lead to certain profile dynamics consisting with the equivalence. The convergence to (pure) Nash equilibriums is investigated. Finally, the projection of finite games to the subspace of potential games is considered, and a simple formula is given to calculate the projection. The dynamics between a game and its projection is compared, which produces a method to verify the convergence of an evolutionary game to a Nash equilibrium or an ε-equilibrium. © 2014 TCCT, CAA.
收录类别:EI;SCOPUS
资源类型:会议论文;期刊论文
原文链接:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84907943710&doi=10.1109%2fChiCC.2014.6895886&partnerID=40&md5=0b5bbf5197d2d6ed0d8c4d6d94d4ff0c
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